Income Taxation -- Deductibility of Employment Agency Fees by Patterson, William S.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 51 | Number 1 Article 14
11-1-1972
Income Taxation -- Deductibility of Employment
Agency Fees
William S. Patterson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William S. Patterson, Income Taxation -- Deductibility of Employment Agency Fees, 51 N.C. L. Rev. 154 (1972).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol51/iss1/14
NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
reviewing court would be powerless to act where the agency had gone
through the formality of listing the alternatives, thus complying with the
procedural requirements of section 102(2)(c). This leaves NEPA with
no muscle to halt an undesirable project after the agency has "filled in
the blanks" by simply listing the alternatives.
Finally, the facts of Froehlke indicate that the inadequacies and
inaccuracies of the environmental impact statement were so great as to
constitute a breach of the procedural as well as the substantive require-
ments of NEPA. The court did not insist upon the detailed considera-
tion of the project that is required by NEPA. Instead it accepted the
self-serving description of the project presented by the Corps of Engi-
neers which casually dismissed many of New Hope's costs and adverse
effects while relying on exaggerated benefits. The inadequate considera-
tion of the alternatives to the project also amounted to noncompliance
with section 102. Section 102 implicitly requires that the reports of
alternatives be complete and accurate. NEPA does not contemplate the
submission of misleading reports. When inaccurate reports are submit-
ted the agency has not even met the procedural requirements of NEPA.
This case could have become the cornerstone of substantive judicial
review under NEPA without breaching the traditional limits on judicial
power. Without doubt, substantive judicial review conjures up visions
of the court completely disregarding a reasonable and well-supported
administrative decision by substituting its own subjective beliefs and
preferences. Agencies on occasion fail to fully consider the
environmental impact of their programs and projects. Section 101
should be interpreted as providing a judicial solution to such situations
without unduly restricting agency discretion.
STEPHEN T. SMITH
Income Taxation-Deductibility of Employment Agency Fees
Within the last few years executive level employees have been seek-
ing new employment as frequently as blue-collar workers.' In a highly
specialized technological or administrative field, employment opportun-
ities are rare, and it is frequently necessary for the job seeker to engage
'Tucker, An Individual's Employment-Seeking Expenses: Analyzing the New Judicial
Climate, 34 J. TAx. 352 (1971).
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the services of an executive employment agency. Is the fee which is paid
to an employment agency or referral service a deductible business ex-
pense2when the agency is unsuccessful in its efforts to locate a new
employment? The Tax Court, in Leonard F. Cremona,3 a decision by
the full court, recently held that the deduction no longer depends upon
whether a new job was actually obtained by the employment agency.
Now the only determination4 is whether the new job is, or would have
been, in the same trade or business in which the employee was working
at the time of the expense. 5
Leonard F. Cremona contracted with Harvard Executive Research
Center, Inc., to pay a fee of $1,500 for job counseling and referral
services concerning available corporate administrative employment
opportunities. No new job was obtained' and Cremona continued to be
employed by the same corporation in the same administrative capacity
as when he first contracted the employment agency. Cremona believed
that there was still a possibility of future job offers although the employ-
ment agency's service had terminated.
The Tax Court held that the dmployment agency fee was a deducti-
ble expense since it was a good faith effort to improve the job opportuni-
ties in the trade or business in which the employee was engaged prior
2INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) states:
"(a) IN GENERAL-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.
Id. § 212, states:
"In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of income .... "
In Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C. 219, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. (58 P-H TAX CT.
Rep.) 1 58.20 (May 4, 1972), and David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970), the Tax Court found the
expense to be deductible under § 162 and refrained from discussing the possibility that a deduction
might also be allowed under § 212.
158 T.C. 219, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (58 P-H Tax Ct. Rep.) 1 58.20 (May 4,
1972).
41d. Although the court discusses only the requirement that the expense must be for seeking
employment in the same trade or business, the discussion of United States v. Generes, 92 S. Ct.
827 (1972), in this note indicates that an additional determination may be required in the future.
See note 39 & accompanying text infra.
51d. at 222, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MENM. DEC. at 153. See also Gale C. Huber, 39 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 1047 (1970), which held that expenses incurred by unemployed persons are business
expenses since those persons are still in the same trade or business of being a particular type of
employee.
6The S1,500 fee was nevertheless paid because it was not contingent on securing a new job.
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to the expenditure. 7 The court stated that outside factors, such as eco-
nomic conditions in the field in which Cremona sought to obtain a new
job, should not determine deductibility.8
After David J. Primuth,0 in 1970, there was a two-part test to
determine the deductibility of employment agency fees. First, the new
employment had to be within the same trade or business in which the
person had been previously employed; secondly, the expenses had to be
for securing a job rather than for merely seeking one.
The requirement that the new job had to be in the same trade or
business as the old job relates to section 1621° of the Internal Revenue
Code. Because a deduction under section 162 is not allowed for expenses
incurred prior to going into a business," the business had to have existed
at the time the expense was incurred. Thus, an employment fee for
changing from one trade or business to another would not have been
deductible since it did not involve carrying on the old trade or business,
and the new trade or business had not yet begun.
For many years, the courts have recognized that a person may be
in the trade of being in a particular profession. Teachers, 3 engineers,"
and even corporate executives15 have been recognized as persons engag-
ing in a trade or business. This concept has been expanded to the point
that expenses incurred by persons who were unemployed have been
allowed as deductible business expenses because they were still in the
758 T.C. at 222, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEm. DEc. at 153. The Tax Court was willing to
accept the taxpayer's contention that he was in the trade or business of being an "administrator."
If such broad categories are considered a trade or business in the future, the possible difficulties
in obtaining a business expense deduction for employment agency fees which are discussed in this
note will be substantially reduced.
8Id.
954 T.C. 374 (1970). The taxpayer in Primuth was secretary-treasurer of one corporation and
paid a noncontingent fee to an employment agency. As a result of the efforts of the agency, the
taxpayer accepted employment with another corporation as controller and assistant to the vice
president of finance. The new employment was held to be in the same trade or business and the
business expense deduction was allowed under § 162(a).
"See note 2 supra.
"Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965). In this case
expenses of a television corporation to train personnel several years before receiving an operation
license were denied. These expenses were not incurred in "carrying on a trade or business" as
required by § 162.
"E.g., Furner v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968); Harold A. Christensen, 17 T.C.
1456 (1952).
'Furner v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1968).
"Kenneth R. Kenfield, 54 T.C. 1197, 1199 (1970).
"David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 379 (1970).
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trade or business of being a particular type of employee."6 However,
some judges have expressed a desire to limit this concept severely by
restricting the taxpayer's business to being an employee for the particu-
lar employer for whom he is working.' 7 Consequently, expenses in seek-
ing a job with a new employer would not be deductible because the new
employment would be another trade or business and nearly all employ-
ment agency fee deductions would be destroyed. Fortunately, this con-
ception has yielded to a broad trade or business test such as that utilized
in Cremona."
The second requirement for the deductibility of employment
agency fees prior to Cremona was that the expense had to be for secur-
ing rather than seeking a job. 9 Thejob-seeking and job-securing distinc-
tion was initially evoked in Office Decision 579 in 1920, 0 which stated
that fees paid to secure employment would be allowed as a deduction.
Revenue Ruling 60-158,21 however, specifically stated that all fees paid
to employment agencies were not deductible. In the same year, Revenue
Ruling 60-22322 revoked Revenue Ruling 60-158 and stated that "the
Internal Revenue Service will continue to allow deductions for fees paid
to employment agencies for securing employment." Although the Serv-
ice, through a series of Revenue Rulings, stated that it would only allow
employment agency fees paid for securing a job to be deducted as a
business expense, it made no attempt to develop guidelines to determine
whether a fee was paid for seeking or for securing a job.
In Thomas W. Ryan,23 an employment agency fee was disallowed
as a business expense deduction even though evidence was presented that
the final part of the fee was contingent upon the acquisition of a new
job and that a new job was obtained. Ryan was required to pay a $250
retainer to the employment agency and a $250 final fee contingent upon
the acquisition of a new job. The Tax Court disallowed the retainer as
being an expense for seeking a new job and then disallowed the contin-
gent fee because of lack of proof of payment. This different reason for
denying the final fee was an early indication that the tax court would
"
6Gale C. Huber, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1047 (1970).
"David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 384 (1970) (Tietjens, J., dissenting).
I8See note 7 supra.
"David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 380 (1970).
103 Cum. BULL. 130 (1920).
11960-1 CUm. BULL. 140.
211960-1 CUM. BULL. 57.
228 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 506 (1959).
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distinguish contingent employment agency fees from those which were
paid regardless of whether new employment was obtained.
After Ryan, the Service had argued that deductions for contingent
fees were allowable if the job were actually obtained as a result of the
efforts of the employment agency, 4 but fees paid whether or not the
agency was successful in obtaining employment were for job-seeking,
not job-securing, and were not deductible even if employment was ob-
tained.25 In Primuth this argument was again made, but the Tax Court
found this a "distinction without a difference."2 The purpose and re-
sults of the payments were said by the court to be the same in either
event. The employment agency had practically guaranteed Primuth that
they would find a new job for him .2 Therefore the existence of noncon-
tingent fee did not preclude deductibility so long as the taxpayer was
successful in obtaining a new job in the same trade or business.
The requirement that employment be secured was expanded still
further by Kenneth R. Kenfield.28 In Kenfield, the taxpayer paid a
noncontingent employment agency fee and accepted a new job in the
same trade or business found for him by the employment agency. How-
ever, the taxpayer reconsidered, declined the new job offer, and decided
to remain at this old job because he was given a raise and a promotion.
The Tax Court found that the promotion and raise given by his old
employer was a direct consequence of the new job offer and allowed the
employment fee as a business expense deduction. 29 This case moved the
Tax Court one step closer to completely abandoning the requirement
that the employee must be successful in his attempt to find a new job.
The job-securing half of the two-part test for deductibility has now
been removed by Cremona. The job sought still must be in the same
trade or business, but it does not actually have to be secured before the
"In Carson J. Morris, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1424 (1967), affd, 423 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1970),
an employment agency fee was denied as a business expense deduction because the new job resulted
from the efforts of the taxpayer rather than from those of the employment agency. The court felt
that this was an indication that the fee was for seeking rather than for securing new employment.
2Francois Louis, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1174, 1177-1178 (1966): "While the effect of such
rulings and instructions is not entirely clear, it seems that they would allow as deductions payments
(to employment agencies and perhaps others) for having secured employment for the taxpayer, but
would disallow as deductions amounts paid for seeking employment which are payable irrespective
of whether employment is secured."
2854 T.C. at 380.
2Id.
- 54 T.C. 1197 (1970).
21d. at 1200.
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business deduction is allowed. Does the new test allow a deduction if
the title or description of the new job is the same as that of the old job,
or must the basic skills which are to be used in the new job also be the
same as those used in the old one? Although the requirement that the
new employment must be in the same trade or business existed prior to
Cremona," its coexistence with the job-securing requirement prevented
any thorough development of this test because the deduction could be
denied solely on the basis of failure to secure new employment.
The Commissioner sought to distinguish Cremona from prior 31
cases which had allowed an employment agency fee as a deduction by
citing Eugene A. Carter-2 in which the taxpayer was not successful in
obtaining a new job and the deduction was disallowed. Carter was held
not applicable by the court because the taxpayer in Carter sought to
obtain a job in a different trade or business.3 Prior to Cremona, there
seem to be no significant cases which denied the deductibility of employ-
ment agency fees solely on the basis that the new job was not in the same
trade or business. It would seem that the uncertainty which has devel-
oped in applying the same trade or business test to business deductions
for educational expelses has now been injected into the area of employ-
ment agency fee deductions.34
The post-Cremona taxpayer who incurs expenses in obtaining a
new job which carries a slightly different job title or requires somewhat
different skills or a higher degree of the same skills 5 cannot be certain
that he will be allowed a business expense deduction. It is possible that
such a person, due to the prior lack of emphasis which was placed on
the requirement that the new job be in the same trade or business, would
"E.g., Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932 (1969).
3'E.g., Kenneth R. Kenfield, 54 T.C. 1197 (1970); Guy R. Motto, 54 T.C. 558 (1970); David
J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
3251 T.C. 932 (1969).
"58 T.C. at 221, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. at 152.
"The test which is used to determine the deductibility of education costs as a business expense
is whether the expense was incurred to maintain employment or proficiency in the same trade or
business. The same trade-or-business test, as used in the education expense business deduction
cases, has been characterized by uncertainty. Compare, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp.
597 (N.D. Ohio 1962), affdper curiam, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964), which held that an Internal
Revenue agent could have a business deduction for his expenses in going to law school even though
he quit his job shortly after graduating, with James J. Engel, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1441 (1962),
which held that a law degree qualified an Internal Revenue agent for a new profession and that a
business deduction would not be allowed for the costs of going to school.
'-See 58 T.C. at 224, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. at 154 (Sterrett, J., concurring).
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have been allowed a business expense deduction prior to Cremona but
may not be allowed such a deduction in the future. Since there is now
only one criterion for the deductibility of employment agency fees,
judges may feel compelled to apply it more strictly. Consequently, the
new job may be required to involve exactly the same duties, rather than
merely the same basic skills, as the old job. The Tax Court may no
longer consider an unemployed person to be engaged in a particular
trade or business. 6 There are many ways in which the same trade or
business test could be modified by judicial interpretation so as to disal-
low deductions which had previously been allowed in situations in which
the taxpayer was successful in obtaining new employment.
Another problem may be presented when the taxpayer has paid an
employment agency fee but has been unsuccessful in obtaining new
employment. A determination of the type of new employment which the
taxpayer was seeking would have to be made before there could be any
determination whether the job sought would constitute a new trade or
business. If the taxpayer was seeking new employment which was not
the same as his present trade or business, the deduction seemingly would
be disallowed. Even though the requirement that a new job must be
secured no longer exists, the business expense deduction apparently
would be allowed only for a good faith effort to secure employment in
the same" trade or business.
An even more difficult situation would be the one in which the
taxpayer not only would be willing to accept new employment in the
same trade or business in which he is presently employed but also would
be willing to accept employment in a different trade or business. Such
a consideration would seem to call for a determination of the dominant
desires in seeking new employment. It would be impossible to deter-
mine, with any degree of exactness, whether the taxpayer wanted em-
ployment in a new trade or business more than he wanted new employ-
ment in the same trade or business. Faced with the difficulty of this
determination, the Tax Court might restrict deductions in this area by
disallowing the employment agency fee when the taxpayer is willing to
accept employment in a field other than his present trade or business
but is unsuccessful in obtaining either. If the taxpayer was willing to
accept employment in a field other than his trade or business and was
"See note 16 supra.
358 T.C. at 222, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. at 153.
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unsuccessful in getting a new job, then, under the rigid interpretation
suggested above, he would be in the same position as he would have been
before Cremona since the deduction would have been denied because no
new job was obtained. Furthermore, the taxpayer might be in a less
desirable position after Cremona if he had expressed a willingness to
accept employment either in his present trade or business or in some
other field and then acquired new employment in his present trade or
business. The deduction would have been allowed prior to Cremona
since he obtained new employment in the same trade or business. But
the expense might now be disallowed because the taxpayer was willing
to accept employment in some other trade or business when he incurred
the expense. At present there is no way to determine the manner in
which the Tax Court will treat a willingness to accept employment in
some other trade or business. Although the same trade or business test
was frequently mentioned prior to Cremona, the decisions had been
made largely on the basis of a failure to secure a new job.3"
The general area of business purpose was discussed in United
States v. Generes,39 a recent Supreme Court decision which held that
a business expense will be allowed only if the trier of fact determines
that the dominant motive for the claimed business expenditure was a
business purpose. Cremona requires that the expense must be for at-
tempting to find a new job in the same trade or business. The determina-
tion in both Generes and Cremona concerns business purpose. Generes
involves the entire area of business purpose while Cremona requires that
a specific business purpose, to find a job in the same trade or business,
must be present. Generes could affect the outcome of future cases in
which employment agency fee deductions are sought since the specific
business purpose required by Cremona could be present-while the domi-
nant motive, which Generes requires must be a business purpose, might
be lacking. References to Generes and its possible impact upon
Cremona were made in two of the concurring opinions in Cremona."
Judge Tannenwald, with whom two judges agreed, and Judge Sterrett
indicated that Generes may have a restrictive influence on employment
agency fee deductions. They stated that the majority's same trade or
business determination, combined with the dominant motive require-
"E.g., Eugene v. Carter, 51 T.C. 932 (1969).
1192 S. Ct. 827 (1972).
458 T.C. at 223-24, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEm. DEc. at 154 (Tannenwald & Sterrett, JJ.,
concurring).
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ment in Generes, was sufficient to prevent an unduly broad allowance
of deductions in this area. An example of the effect which the Generes
opinion could have upon Cremona would be if a taxpayer paid an em-
ployment agency fee to locate a new job in exactly the same trade or
business and his dominant motive for changing jobs was a nonbusiness
motive, such as a change of cliiinate. If the Cremona criterion were used
alone, the deduction would be allowed since this was an attempt to get
a new job in the same trade or business. However, because the dominant
motive for the expense was a nonbusiness purpose, the deduction would
not be allowed under Generes.
When the Tax Court ceased to use the job-securing requirement for
determining the deductibility of employment agency fees, it repudiated
a test which was both unfair to the taxpayer and illogical in relation to
section 16241 of the Internal Revenue Code. But the job-securing distinc-
tion did have one appealing advantage-it was definite and consequently
easy to apply. The same trade or business test, applied alone, is both
fair and logical in that it allows a deduction for an expense which is
related to the taxpayer's trade or business. Unfortunately, it is presently
undeveloped and offers no definite guidelines for the taxpayer. Addi-
tionally, it may be difficult to develop clear and definite guidelines due
to the difficulty in determining a subjective factor such as the dominant
motive and the room for interpretation in determining whether the new
employment is within the same trade or business. In the area of educa-
tional empense deductions, where the same trade or business criterion
has been used for years,42 the persisting uncertainty as to whether spe-
cific deductions will be allowed portends equal future uncertainty in
predicting the deductibility of employment agency fees.
WILLIAM S. PATTERSON
Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Eviction and the Absolute Right to
Choose Not to Have Any Tenants
When a landlord is unwilling to bring his rental units into compli-
ance with housing code provisions, does his ownership of the property
include the absolute right to discontinue rental of all such units? If so,
4 See note 2 supra.
12See note 34 supra.
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